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In a May 2016 Forbes article titled, “Is Mexico City Turning into New York City?” 
Mexico City resident and architect Fernando Madrid celebrates the increased safety of his city 
and the presence of “big corporations and luxury hotels.” The central comparison of the article is 
with New York: “Neighborhoods like Roma and Condesa are like Soho, the West Village. In 
terms of diversity and culture it’s like New York, you can find people from all over the world 
here.” The article goes on to laud the newfound cosmopolitanism, real estate development, and 
increasing numbers of young, upper-middle class professionals like engineers and accountants in 
El Distrito Federal (often abbreviated as DF). Two spaces mentioned as exemplary of the city’s 
success are downtown, where Madrid lives, and the Santa Fe business district (“maybe the 
equivalent of mid-town [Manhattan],” according to Madrid). The article makes clear that 
“Mexico City’s pursuit of New York City’s success isn’t an accident, but rather the result of 
careful policy making and planning” (Flannery 2016).  
Indeed it is, but upon closer examination we see how DF’s contemporary situation 
emerged from a variety of plans and forces, not all of which are as rosy and harmonious as the 
article implies. The article’s comparisons with New York City and its linear narrative of DF’s 
development from being a “dirty, dangerous city…[to being] a world-class metropolis” are 
examples of a widespread discursive trend. Through the umbrella analytics of “globalization,” 
“modernization,” “neoliberalism,” and others, both mainstream and academic discourses 
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homogenize social life across continents and societies. Although these concepts point to the far-
reaching effects of trans-local movements of capital and the apparent dominance of Western 
modern cultural forms, they belie both the targeted and variegated character of the so-called 
global economy as well as the heterogeneity of discourse and practice within the workings of 
global capital itself. As Tsing argues, despite the “synergy” of many actors’ “globalist projects,” 
(defined as “relatively coherent bundles of ideas and practices” that invoke the global), there is 
no single global process but rather “varied agendas, practices, and processes that may or may not 
be deeply interconnected at a given historical moment” (Tsing 2008, 85, 73). In this formulation 
of globalization, claims to global connectivity and prosperity are always partial and articulated 
among other competing claims and realities of scale and substance.  
In this analysis of the “globalization” of Mexico City, I target two distinct globalist 
projects that are both tied by the movements and demands of transnational capital and its 
contemporary neoliberal forms. Although the neoliberal restructuring to the pace and standards 
of the global economy in Mexico and Mexico City is a real phenomenon, to rigorously analyze 
this process of ostensible connection and development we must interrogate the plurality of 
claims and projects involved and their specific logics. This requires analysis of the implicit or 
explicit “subjects authorized to participate” in particular globalist imaginaries, of what 
“channels” or methods are taken to produce a particular globalist ideal, and of the gaps and 
alignments between imagination and implementation (Tsing 2008, 77). While remembering that 
“the very search for overlaps, alliances, collaborations, and complicities is one of the most 
important phenomena we could study,” we see how globalist projects engendered by and for the 
Mexican state’s neoliberal turn are uniquely targeted, emergent, and coterminous (73). Through 
comparison of two such projects in Mexico City (namely, the construction of the Santa Fe 
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business district and the “rescue” of historic downtown), we see both commonalities and 
divergences in the social realities invoked and created in this current moment of neoliberal 
capitalism. This comparison reveals the way in which neoliberal development and the successful 
functioning of transnational capital is differentially articulated and implemented (or “channeled”) 
according to the prior material and cultural positioning of space.  
Despite the abstract validity of analyzing both of these projects as articulations of 
neoliberal capitalism, this analysis emerges from the recognition that the material and ideological 
differences in how these processes take shape matter for how differently positioned and 
categorized spaces and persons fit in the so-called “global era.” Both projects involve 
government abandonment of the city to private actors and market methods as well as violent 
police coercion, integral practices of an authoritarian neoliberal governmentality. Situated within 
the hegemonic discourses of legality and “development,” (Escobar 1995) this governmentality is 
in many ways the necessary counterpart to the social ills created by the Mexican state’s 
economic restructuring in the 1980s and ‘90s; the macro-scale “opening up” of the Mexican 
economy to foreign markets engendered the lack of jobs and subsequent preponderance of the 
“informal economy,” the very target of on-the-ground exclusionary methods. Both projects also 
entail a kind of Western modern vision. But despite these important overlaps, their divergences 
are significant. Here I analyze aesthetic, financial, and spatial-symbolic differences to unpack the 
variety of “channels” in which physical space can be imagined and inscribed as “global.” 
These channels emerge from key socio-historical differences between the spaces of Santa 
Fe and downtown. For one, the Santa Fe megaproject was constructed literally on top of a 
garbage dump, and the variety of private and public actors involved in its development took this 
and its other apparent lacks (including its disposable population) as reason to plan as if from 
		 	
Hayman  
4	
scratch into a “non-place” empty of cultural meaning and place-bound identity. This capacity to 
be a “non-place” positively requires there to be no recognized history, meaning, or social worth. 
Downtown, whose more culturally sanctioned history makes it a prime site for “heritage tourism, 
a cornerstone of the local global city strategy” (Becker and Muller 2013, 84), required a different 
kind of global imaginary in which Mexican national culture and identity (as spatially bounded 
and commodified “local” Culture and History) coexist with global capitalist modernity. Again, 
for both projects exclusionary measures were taken to undermine the “informal economy,” the 
group of DF denizens left unemployed and unemployable by the Mexican state’s neoliberal turn. 
This exclusion is integral to both projects; in order to attract and house both national and 
transnational capital, globalist actors take action to cleanse space of “local” undesirables. But 
while in Santa Fe the method of exclusion was insidious planning, a more visible approach was 
taken for downtown, namely the hiring of former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani by 
Mexican private actors, ostensibly for help with crime and police reform. This difference in 
“making globality” reflects the differential “channels” of globalization, the ways that “each 
project has come into being along a different historical trajectory, with different material and 
political resources and objectives” (Tsing 2008, 68, 74). These divergent, “unpredictable 
interactions among specific cultural legacies” both aim for a kind of global development through 
lines of inclusion/exclusion, but the exigencies of space and culture create and pull from 
different rhetorical techniques, materialities, and practices of transnational neoliberal capitalism. 
Different aspects, practices, and entire industries of global capitalist development are put in relief 
depending on the demands and uses of the projects’ respective spatial-symbolic targets. 
 These projects are structured by Mexico’s neoliberal reforms begun in the 1980s and the 
country’s “opening up” to the global economy. Important for these reforms is their reception in 
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urban centers like Mexico City. In particular, this economic restructuring aligns with the 
emergence of a “network of global cities,” also dating from the ‘80s (Sassen 2002, 2). Sassen 
argues that the emergence of finance capital and the apparent dispersal of the world economy 
engendered a concomitant geographic centralization of the global economic system in connected 
urban centers (3, 4). Acting as a territorial “node” of the ostensibly deterritorialized economy of 
finance and transnational capital, Mexico City fits into this connectivity as a “global city.” 
Important to note is the variegated nature of this connection of capital movements vis-à-vis 
space. Contrary to mainstream conceptions of globalization as a homogenously distributed 
connecting force, global city connectivity is predicated on the deliberate disconnection from 
cities’ “local” surroundings. As Sassen puts it, “there is a specific geography of globalization…it 
is not a planetary event encompassing all of the world” (10). Furthermore, DF’s entrance into 
this global connectivity and prosperity was not seamless, involving numerous difficulties 
characteristic of so-called developing economies’ “opening up” to the global market. 
Because of a debt crisis that signaled the failures of the “inward” import-substitution 
economy, in 1982 the Mexican state (following many nation-states) implemented neoliberal 
reforms. This neoliberal turn saw the deregulation of the economy and labor market, the 
liberalization of the financial sector, the privatization of state-owned industries, the reorientation 
of domestic production to foreign markets, wage reductions, and the withdrawal of social 
services (Parnreiter 2002, 147-155). This “opening” of the economy initially harmed Mexico 
City’s standing in the national economy, for its central function as both a domestic market and a 
production site was diminished (149-155). The 1980s and 1990s saw a slight recovery of the 
manufacturing sector, but more important was the growth of the service industry, including a 75 
percent increase in employment in “real estate, financial, and professional services” between 
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1987 and 1997 (151). This matches onto the general trend of global cities’ “formation of a new 
urban economic core of financial and service activities that comes to replace the older, typically 
manufacturing-oriented core” (Sassen 2002, 16). As we will see, these massive shifts in the 
economics and labor market of El Distrito Federal entailed serious impasses.  
 Alongside these developments from Mexico’s neoliberal turn was the emergence of the 
so-called informal economy that filled the gaps in employment for the non-professional classes. 
Mexico City witnessed both a “metropolitization of crime” and a “dramatic informalization of 
employment and the impoverishment of large segments of the urban workforce” (Becker and 
Muller 2013, 82). In addition to the collapse of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) party-
state and the growth of the drug trade as a result of the U.S Drug Enforcement Agency’s closing 
off of trade through Colombia, economic liberalization (such as the signing of NAFTA in 1994) 
played a major role in augmenting crime in Mexico and DF, particularly since the 1990s (Davis 
2013, 55). As we will see in the cases of Santa Fe and downtown, the social ills of crime and the 
survival strategies of the informal economy (produced by neoliberal structural reforms) are in 
turn made the target of authoritarian, coercive, and market-oriented tactics. The dynamic of 
macroeconomic reform and subsequent micro-scale techniques such as policing reflect the way 
market ideologies and policies must continually work to create the reality they promote through 
techniques of discipline and exclusion of that which does not fit the market model of global 
capitalist development. In the case of the informal economy in DF, this neoliberal discipline is 
ironic and contradictory; what may be called the “entrepreneurial spirit” of many in the informal 
economy is nonetheless backward and undesirable within the global imaginaries of elite actors.  
This accords with the nature of neoliberalism as a philosophical and practical endeavor. 
As Mirowski notes, neoliberalism has never been static, “but is better understood as a 
		 	
Hayman  
7	
transnational movement requiring time and substantial effort in order to attain the modicum of 
coherence and power it has achieved today” (Mirowski 2009, 426). Both a “philosophical and 
political project,” the market ideologies that sanction policies of privatization and state 
withdrawal require disciplinary practices to create the reality to which they attest (426). 
Analogous to Escobar’s critique of “development” discourse, neoliberalism “thrive[s] more 
through the coherence of its internal logic than through any insight into the social situation” in 
which it is applied (Tsing 2008, 68). In the globalist projects of Santa Fe and downtown, making 
the claim to global development real requires the tightening of loose screws, so to speak; those 
left behind by the neoliberal turn and forced to survive in the “informal economy” are rendered 
threats to the yet-to-come prosperity of the market order and governed as such by both state and 
market actors. Comparison of Santa Fe and historic downtown (Centro Historico) reveals how 
this dynamic between market-geared structural reform and small-scale targeting of subjects and 
spaces is differentially articulated and “channeled.” In other words, the end of ensuring the 
viability of neoliberal reforms and the successful functioning of transnational capital entails 
specific culturally and historically defined methods of actualization. 
  
The Santa Fe Megaproject as Neoliberal Overhaul  
 The Santa Fe megaproject illustrates one “channel” of this authoritarian exclusionary 
development. As a site of global capital, it articulated and abetted the wider neoliberal transition 
of Mexico and the eventual emergence of Mexico City as a global “node.” Begun in the 1980s by 
the city government (in the thick of Mexico’s economic reforms), 
the objective of the more than 2,000 acre development was to attract global investment 
through the creation of a wide-ranging plan that would house transnational companies, 
shopping malls, cafes, restaurants, movie theaters, a convention center, private schools 
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and universities, health services, high-end gated communities, and exclusive apartment 
buildings (Moreno-Carranco 2014b, 4).  
 
The history of implementing this plan is tortuous, involving multiple mayors, presidents, and 
private actors distributed across different moments of the project’s progress. Since the 1950s, the 
city used portions of the space of Santa Fe as a garbage dump. The land also contained sand 
mines, which were owned and quarried by miners until depletion in the ‘80s. The conditions for 
the megaproject thus included removal of the pepenadores or garbage pickers who made a living 
off the garbage dump, and of the miners. It is not certain how coercive or mutual were the ceding 
of former mine lands and the removal of the miners. The pepenadores, who held no titles to the 
land and were relocated twice, were more clearly expropriated. Their first relocation, in 1987, 
was to Tlayapaca, a plot of land near a new landfill called Prados de la Montaña. Upon closing of 
this landfill and their expropriation from Tlayapaca, 900 families of pepenadores were finally 
removed from the space of Santa Fe into the city’s periphery (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 193).  
Other impasses to the project followed larger political and economic trends in Mexico. 
The Mexican state’s debt crisis, the disastrous earthquake in 1985, and the decline of the state’s 
oil industry all contributed to slow development in Santa Fe in the ‘80s (193). Although Mexican 
and foreign private actors invested in the project in the early ‘90s, the resignation of then-mayor 
Manuel Camacho (one of the project’s key progenitors) stunted government involvement, and 
many plans were left unfinished (Moreno-Carranco 2014, 5). It was also later revealed that 
Carlos Salinas (the president of Mexico at the time) used much of the money set aside for Santa 
Fe for other development projects peppered around Mexico City (6). According to Moreno-
Carranco (2014), this back and forth in investment and construction “must be viewed as part of a 
longer history of the deep involvement of political figures and bureaucrats in urban development 
and landmark projects in Mexico City” (7). Characteristic of “a lack of accountability typical of 
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the Mexican political system,” many development projects are started by mayors with 
presidential or national aspirations only to be left unfinished (7).  
These political setbacks, rather than rendering the project a failure, are in a sense 
constitutive of Santa Fe’s success. Without understating the role of state and local government 
actors in the construction of Santa Fe, the project’s profitability and success in housing 
transnational capital are ultimately due to the functioning of capital itself; the heavy privatization 
and commercialization of the land of Santa Fe allowed the project to absorb socio-political 
impasses. The project’s primary development agency, Servicios Metropolitanos (SERVIMET), 
illustrates this dynamic of state and market. SERVIMET, dubbed a public-private partnership, 
was chiefly an agency of commercialization that worked to attract national and transnational 
capital (Jones and Moreno-Carranco 2007, 12). Exemplary of neoliberal development, through 
SERVIMET the Santa Fe megaproject was effectively “a real estate development project 
orchestrated by a government agency and operated as a private entity” (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 
192). Here we have a prime example of the mutuality between state and market in neoliberal 
development. Contrary to claims that state power is undermined by increased privatization of 
public space, in the case of Santa Fe such a clear dichotomous power relation between state and 
market is not analytically useful.  
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Figure 1. “First master plan for Santa Fe. It is possible to see the megaproject as ‘floating’ in the 
middle of the green areas and splintered horizontally by the Mexico-Toluca Freeway. It is also 
possible to appreciate how most of the vertical streets are dead ends or cul-de-sacs. The regular 
and irregular settlements surrounding the megaproject were considered irrelevant to the goals of 
the project and were therefore erased. Source: Carpeta básica de información Santa Fe by 
SERVIMET, early 1980s” (Moreno-Caranco 2014a, 198). 
Aiwa Ong (2006) refers to this blurry relation between state and market as the “neoliberal 
exception.” In Ong’s formulation, neoliberalism is a dynamic negotiation between state and 
private actors in which citizen-subjects and spaces are differentially included or excluded 
according to the demands of market-based development. Santa Fe, as a delineated space of 
global capitalist development with a concomitantly defined population of particular kinds of 
subjects, exemplifies Ong’s analysis: 
The spatial concentration of strategic political, economic, and social conditions attracts 
foreign investment, technology transfer, and international expertise to particular zones of 
high growth. Market-driven strategies of spatial fragmentation respond to the demands of 
global capital for diverse categories of human capital, thus engendering a pattern of 
noncontiguous, differently administered spaces of “graduated” or “variegated 
sovereignty” (7).  
 
Though not as drastic as China’s “Special Economic Zone” (SEZs) (see Ngai 2005), the space of 
Santa Fe was nonetheless rendered “special” and exceptional in its designation as a “Controlled 
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Development Special Zone” (Zona Especial de Desarrollo Controlado, or ZEDEC) (Moreno-
Carranco 2014a, 195). Despite the many impasses in the project’s development into a hub of 
global capital, this designation ensured its success. That being said, SERVIMET’s privatization 
and commercialization are but one level of this story. To fully ensure the success of 
SERVIMET’s development methods, other acts of socio-spatial engineering were required. 
Reinforcing Sassen’s claim that global city spaces require active disconnection, Santa Fe hinged 
upon a dynamic of exclusion and separation vis-à-vis both symbolic and material space, and 
financial and human capital.  
 Financially, the Santa Fe megaproject was to some extent autonomous. On one level, 
some financial autonomy is inherent to privatized growth. However, it is important to hold in 
view the state-market dynamic wherein autonomous private growth and control of space is made 
possible by prior state orchestration. Thus, SERVIMET, Santa Fe’s public-private development 
agency, was financially self-sufficient and even “referred to as a company” despite its ostensibly 
public sanction (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 193). The agency’s financial autonomy was paralleled 
by its autonomy from popular control, allowing for the near-total commercialization of space to 
cater to investors. This commercialization was highly profitable because of Santa Fe’s prior 
economic value; the project started “with almost no financial investment” (Moreno-Carranco 
2014a, 191). In the early ‘80s, the government paid three Mexican pesos per square meter of 
land; in 2013 the same land could be worth up to $2,000 per square meter (191). This, achieved 
through both national and international investors, translates to a total profit of approximately 
US$85 million (195).  
This profitability also hinged upon the dynamics of space and capital. Spatially, Santa Fe 
demonstrates a lack of connection to the rest of the city. This is so in terms of road infrastructure, 
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public transportation, walkability, and even basic city services like access to the public water 
system (Moreno-Carranco 2014, 6). The latter shortcoming has been accommodated by further 
private methods such as contracted water companies for individual buildings. Those issues that 
impact laborers and lower-class residents (analyzed further below) are simply neglected. The 
government’s failure to provide services to the district has prompted both community action (via 
the Santa Fe Neighborhood Association) and “further privatization and segregation” to ensure 
returns on investment (7). This reflects two aspects of neoliberal development: the dominance of 
the market and the lack of social services engender local survival strategies (also analyzed 
further below), and the dangers of failed development create the need for greater market 
presence and capital accumulation.  
Santa Fe’s disconnection from Mexico City is not merely an aberrant lack, but is 
constitutive of the space as a “special” zone of neoliberal development. Spatial disconnection is a 
practice characteristic of global enclaves within markedly “local” or “underdeveloped” contexts: 
In order to draw down global capital and ‘add value’ the poorer parts of the city need to 
be removed or hidden, kept at a distance through carefully designed highways and open 
spaces, security apparatus and infrastructure networks that unbind the project from the 
remainder of the city but rebind projects to each other and other global spaces (Jones and 
Moreno-Carranco 2007, 4). 
 
Santa Fe’s chief method of disconnection was planning. Through specific zoning measures and 
the privileging of car-based transportation, the project was materially constructed into an “urban 
enclave,” “a distinct urban environment totally separated from the rest of the city” (Moreno-
Carranco 2014a, 197). Even within Santa Fe, space is “disarticulated”: living space is portioned 
off via gated communities, and streets are connected such that it is difficult to move between 
spaces in the area without a car.  
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Underlying both its spatial and financial autonomy and disconnection are the lines of 
inclusion and exclusion vis-à-vis subjects or “human capital.” As a site of high-end consumption 
and bourgeois performance, Santa Fe is inherently exclusionary even without the artful planning 
and policing; participation in this globalism of expensive consumption and professional labor 
implies a population of market-subjects with a certain class background. As the removal of the 
pepenadores and the sand miners illustrates, lower-class subjects were not compatible. The space 
of Santa Fe was rendered effectively empty, ripe for total social overhaul for a future population. 
The disposability of its residents and the rendering of the space as underdeveloped were part and 
parcel of a particular globalist developmental path; as one high-ranking government official 
stated, “A bunch of filthy people are not going to stop modernity” (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 
187).  
Of course, there are gaps between the global ideal of Santa Fe and the space’s daily social 
life. For one, the inequalities and class conflict inhering in the space’s high-end spaces of 
consumption are present in varying ways. For one, Santa Fe “is the only area in the city in which 
people with the highest income per capita are physically adjacent to some of the poorest areas in 
the city” (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 190). In the face-to-face sociality of Santa Fe’s consumptive 
spaces, the prevalent dichotomy pointed out by Hannerz (1990) between the global/cosmopolitan 
and the local is articulated through race and class: “global” cosmopolitan consumers, restaurant 
servers, and high-end boutique staff are lighter-skinned, relatively tall, and marked by 
consumption and dress, and the “local” “‘auxiliary’ staff who clean the tables, guard the stores, 
or tend to the toilets are shorter and darker than the clientele” (Jones and Moreno-Carranco 2007, 
15). In addition to these lower class laborers are those in the “informal economy” mentioned 
above.   
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This includes illegal street vendors and frenaleros, illegal car-parkers. The street vendors 
furtively make a living selling food via cell phones and the trunks of illegally parked cars (18). 
Although the Santa Fe Neighbors Association promulgated billboards that read: “Do not promote 
the street vending, it affects us all. It is illegal, generates insecurity, garbage, pollutes the area 
and damages the development’s image,” the warnings are largely ignored (20). And while 
policing of this “informal economy” is also an exclusionary practice in Santa Fe, we will see this 
method emphasized stronger and through its own globalist channel in the case of downtown. To 
emphasize the stark contradictions of the space, it is important to note that these laborers coexist 
alongside two thousand corporations, four shopping malls, 12 hotels, 230 restaurants, 40 movie 
theaters, schools, hospitals, and up-scale gated communities and apartment complexes (Moreno-
Carranco 2014, 6). The active attempts at excluding those working outside of the “formal” labor 
market are one way of at least visually trying to secure the apparent prosperity of Santa Fe.  
In addition to these financial, spatial, and subject-based lines of disconnection, Santa Fe 
also disconnects itself from its surrounding urban context through aesthetics. Characteristic of 
globalist megaprojects, Santa Fe symbolically sets itself off from its “local” surroundings 
through a “non-place” modernist aesthetic devoid of any national or other identity-based marks 
of distinction (Jones and Moreno-Caranco 2007, 3, 4). This deliberate erasure of the “local” is an 
attempt to transcend place and culture in favor of a cosmopolitanism marked by high-end 
consumption and hyper-modern architectural homogeneity. Other examples of this aesthetic 
practice are airports as well as spaces of financial markets. As Zaloom (2006) demonstrates in 
her ethnography of the world of finance and trading, space and material infrastructure are central 
representations of market actors’ conceptions of market activity. In her analysis, market space is 
envisioned and constructed with the intent of autonomy and disconnection vis-à-vis traders’ and 
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their lives outside the market (Zaloom, 164). The representation of “market rationalization” is, 
however, always culturally defined: “the materials of rationalization are both human and 
technological, shaped by social labor and the culturally organized preferences and practices of 
the same actors they are designed to constrain” (165). The aesthetics of Santa Fe similarly hinges 
upon a specific cultural conception of “global” existence that is both rational and autonomous. 
This translates to the erasure of the social.  
 The globalism of Santa Fe practices this erasure on multiple levels. This is made possible 
by its prior rendering as a literal and figurative garbage dump empty of history and filled with 
persons incompatible with the space’s future as a site of global capital’s productive and 
consumptive trappings. But, despite the conceptual and architectural attempt at erasing 
undesirables, so-called “local” life coexists in the informal economy of street vendors and illegal 
car parkers, and in the surviving sights and smells of the garbage the district is built upon (Jones 
and Moreno-Carranco 2007, 21). In short, the aesthetics, spatial and financial methods of 
implementation, and the subject-based lines of inclusion and exclusion all express a globalism 
“of an almost-but-not-quite-there globality” that may connect the world to Mexico City vis-à-vis 
transnational capital, but is also an extended act of authoritarian neoliberal exclusion and 
targeted disconnection (Tsing 2008, 71). Contradicting globalist rhetoric of “linkage and 
circulation [that] appears positive for everyone involved,” the project had an audience of 
investors and an imagined population of bourgeois cosmopolitans, in deliberate neglect of both 
the area’s prior occupants and the construction workers and other non-professional laborers that 
make Santa Fe function today (Tsing 2008, 71). The actualization of this project of global 
development continues.  
		 	
Hayman  
16	
 
Figure 2. “Food ‘stand’ in Santa Fe © Courtesy of Maria Moreno-Carranco.” (accessed via 
http://www.mascontext.com/issues/3-work-fall-09/publics-works/) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Construction workers buying lunch in Santa Fe © Courtesy of Maria Moreno-Carranco 
(accessed via http://www.mascontext.com/issues/3-work-fall-09/publics-works/) 
 
The “Rescue” of Downtown and Commodified Culture 
Downtown Mexico City has a deep history as a target of globalist projects. To reiterate 
Tsing’s analysis, plurality is inherent in “globalization.” The analysis to follow is therefore not 
only coterminous with Santa Fe, but also with other globalist projects located in downtown. Here 
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I take the so-called “rescue” of downtown by prominent Mexican private actors and former New 
York City mayor Rudolph Guiliani as one kind of globalist project rooted in neoliberal capitalist 
development. When taken in comparison with Santa Fe, illustrative similarities and differences 
emerge that have analytic value for unpacking the dynamic between neoliberal capitalism and 
space. In this case of making globality in downtown, we see practices of exclusion geared toward 
real estate development engendered by the desire of attracting transnational capital, much like 
Santa Fe. Also in line with Santa Fe, these exclusionary measures are structured by Mexico’s 
economic reforms in the 1980s and ‘90s and the subsequent “metropolotization of crime” and 
informal economy cited above. But the differences in downtown’s prior spatial and cultural 
baggage necessitated different methods of exclusion and a different rhetorical and aesthetic 
imaginary to manage these social ills for the successful functioning of global capital. These 
differences put in relief other “channels” of the globalisms constructed on behalf of transnational 
capital.  
Like Santa Fe, this globalism can also be viewed in terms of space (as both a material and 
ideal/symbolic category), capital, and subjects. Unlike Santa Fe’s prior status as a literal and 
figurative garbage dump, the space of downtown has a culturally sanctioned history, made 
globally recognized by the UNESCO declaration of the city’s historic center “a leading 
patrimony of humanity” in 1987 (Davis, 62). This space has a long-running history dating to 
Spanish colonialism that is too vast to discuss here. For unpacking its role in this particular 
globalist project, it suffices to say that as an important historical site the space functions as a 
commodified (i.e., both ideally and materially reified, discrete, and marketable) entity. The 
“rescue” of Centro Historico points to the reclaiming of this important space for both the nation 
and the world at large. In this way the space is a site for both national pride and identity (in direct 
		 	
Hayman  
18	
contradistinction with Santa Fe) and a kind of global humanistic responsibility. Catering to the 
tourism industry is of course a key factor in this commodification of national heritage for 
“global” consumption, as the ultimate target of much of Guiliani’s reforms turned out to be the 
centers of tourism. Despite the claims and rhetoric of Guiliani, Slim, and other elite actors 
involved in this “rescue” mission, we will see that the primary goals of the solicitation of 
Guiliani were profit and development rather than actually addressing problems with crime or the 
police.  
 
	
Figure 4. “A waiter pours a Coca-Cola in Mexico City's Colonia Roma. Photo by Nathaniel 
Parish Flannery” (Forbes 2016; cited above). The coexistence of Coca-Cola with a commodified 
“local” mortar (un molcajete) in an ostensibly high-end restaurant is exemplary of the globalism 
of historic downtown.  
The case of downtown highlights the larger necessity of global cities to ensure a secure 
space for capital, a need shared with Santa Fe but articulated through a different global 
“channel.” For urban hubs of global capital, financial and consumptive, “the increasingly global 
rhetoric of law and order and zero tolerance relating to physical security has become intrinsically 
linked with financial security” (Mitchell and Beckett 2008, 94). To be Sassen’s global city with 
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global city functions and global culture (i.e., to effectively carry out the needs of finance capital, 
accommodate the cosmopolitan aspirations of the subjects involved in such labor, and make the 
space suitable for other transnational businesses), the image of security is necessary. 
Specifically, this image is desired for the blessings of U.S. bond-rating agencies like S&P, 
Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch. These agencies effectively form a hegemonic force that 
acts upon city governments, for their judgment of a city’s viability as a site of investment capital 
corresponds to the city’s alignment with the neoliberal market paradigm, of which physical 
security plays a major role (94). For downtown Mexico City this force was articulated through 
the infamous Rudolph Giuliani as well as a group of prominent Mexican private actors, including 
Carlos Slim, the richest person in Mexico and former richest person in the world. Integral to the 
story of these two international personages of urban neoliberalism are Giuliani’s international 
fame for his claims to developing New York City in the 1990s, and Carlos Slim’s leadership in 
the “rescue” of downtown Mexico City.  
 During his two terms as mayor of New York City in the 1990s, Rudolph Giuliani not 
only practiced aggressive neoliberal policies on the structural level (privatization, the withdraw 
of social services, and laws against labor, the homeless, and other marginal populations), but also 
promoted micro-scale aggressive law enforcement (Mitchell and Beckett 2008, 85). For Guiliani, 
“urban ills such as homelessness, panhandling, drug use, petty crime, squatting, and illegal 
vending were…security risks that should be dealt with quickly and harshly” (88). Central to this 
dynamic of development and social ills is the role of the bond-rating agencies mentioned above: 
the “key to attracting capital, tourists, and residents with disposable income is the promotion of a 
city as a safe place to live, work, travel, and shop” (88). To achieve this safe place for capital and 
its corresponding subjects and lifestyle, Guiliani practiced a “zero tolerance” policy based on the 
		 	
Hayman  
20	
so-called “broken windows” philosophy of policing (89). This perspective on social ills takes 
individual minor legal offenses such as public drunkenness, unlicensed vending or other work 
like washing car windows, panhandling, prostitution, and other illegal minutiae “as very serious 
matters” that, if quelled, would improve the overall safety and health of society (89). (The 
infamous “stop and frisk” method of policing emerges from this philosophy). In short, we have 
an approach to urban development that heightens inequalities through a dynamic of macro-scale 
neoliberal policies and their necessary exclusionary micro-counterparts. Here we see clearly how 
market-oriented plans of social betterment require small, violent coercive measures to exclude 
those persons deemed a threat to the neoliberal order.  
Despite much criticism for his policies in New York, Giuliani gained international 
renown in the hegemonic circles of bond-rating agencies, and this has made him a likely 
consultant for developing nations the world over seeking help with crime, particularly in Latin 
America. Since the agencies’ “expert” judgment of risk is “predicated on a firm belief in the 
efficacy and necessity of U.S.-style neoliberal market reforms,” city mayors’ “desperate desire to 
maintain strong relations with U.S.-dominated agencies frequently leads to municipal policies at 
odds with their stated mandates of poverty alleviation, including new ‘security measures’” (93, 
94). In Mexico City, the apparent need to secure the space of downtown through the exclusion of 
undesirables making a living informally for lack of employment (again, a need produced by the 
larger neoliberal reforms of the Mexican state) allowed for the direct hiring of Guiliani by a 
group of prominent private actors, chiefly Carlos Slim. The prominence of profit-seeking actors 
in handling a supposedly public issue was made possible by Mexico City’s political history of 
stalemate on police reform and the perceived urgency of the burgeoning problem of crime and 
the informal economy (Davis, 58).  
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Analogous to the case of Santa Fe, the failures in the public sphere gave way to reliance 
on the ostensible stability and power of large amounts of capital to solve social problems. Also 
like Santa Fe, the hiring of Giuliani by private actors may be viewed in terms of Ong’s 
“neoliberal exception” in which the normal functioning of the law and the police is suspended to 
accommodate capital. Thus, despite widespread “outrage at the assumption that foreign 
consultants with almost no knowledge of Mexican social and legal institutions would be able to 
address the problems of Mexico City in any meaningful way,” Giuliani was given a US$4.3 
million contract (Davis, 58, 59). The details of who invited him and who footed the bill are 
murky, but there are theories that either Slim or the leftist mayor at the time (Manuel Lopez 
Obrador) sent the initial invite, and that Slim likely paid for much of the bill (58). Even if 
Obrador had no active role in the matter, his approval nonetheless points again to the dynamic 
interplay between the state and market in producing special or exceptional cases for the sake of 
capital.  
In the end, Giuliani’s plan was a transplanted version of his policies in New York, 
neglecting the pervasive problems with the police themselves (including widespread corruption 
and violent impunity) and the fact of limited employment and the necessity of the informal 
economy (Davis, 60). Thus, rather than being a realistic attempt at actual social betterment, the 
zero tolerance plan was a deliberate act of exclusion in the name of it: 
Officially meant to improve the ‘quality of life’ and ‘harmonious cohabitation’ of 
residents, the law overwhelmingly targeted activities related to the informal and 
marginalized economic survival strategies of the urban poor and other practices that 
threatened the preservation of neoliberal urban aesthetics (Becker and Muller, 83). 
 
The contradictions of small-scale targeting of deeply rooted social problems did not register for 
Giuliani or Slim. Arguably, this was but one aspect of their larger plan of neoliberal 
development. As Davis maintains, Giuliani’s help was not merely meant to target undesirables, 
		 	
Hayman  
22	
but, from the beginning, “the Giuliani report may have been solicited…because it was tacitly 
understood that Giuliani would propose policies that would foster downtown real estate 
development and speed the ‘rescue’ of historic Mexico City” (Davis, 61). Like Santa Fe, Giuliani 
and Slim’s claims to reform and “development” stand in for projects of capital accumulation. 
The authoritarian and coercive means of this profit-driven endeavor were made possible by 
hegemonic discourses of legality and the asymmetrical criminalization of the poor and jobless. 
This criminalization is specifically targeted to those in the way of real estate development, in 
neglect of both police impunity and other forms of illegal behavior.  
This argument emerges from the long-held aspirations of Carlos Slim and other 
prominent private investors toward capitalizing on the global cultural capital of downtown, a 
goal unattainable in the 1990s because of crime and deteriorating infrastructure (Davis, 62). 
Previous attempts had been made at this development, but with Guiliani “there would be an 
official-sounding, externally sanctioned, and authoritative strategy peddled by a world-renowned 
‘superhero’ for accomplishing more or less the same aims” (64). On the one hand, we have a 
globalism that rhetorically equalizes urban space and place; DF’s perceived similarities with and 
aspirations to New York were at the heart of the endeavor. (This is also reflected in the Forbes 
article from above, where, incidentally, Giuliani’s reforms are praised). On the other hand, this 
extended analogy between Mexico City and New York City is meant to conceal the more 
fundamental similitude of the two spaces as sources of profit.  
Analysis of the content of Giuliani’s plan reveals his complicity in this endeavor; car 
theft, the most common form of crime in Mexico City, and drug dealing, are notably absent from 
the report, which is filled with “a strong concern with land use, downtown development, and 
public space” (64). Included in this plan was the implementation of high-tech monitoring 
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software throughout the city and a new “quasi-private” police force (65). Of course, both 
Giuliani and Slim, among others, profited off of the project in varying ways (for Giuliani, 
consulting contracts; for Slim, ownership of land bought just before and after Giuliani’s visit) 
(65). Ultimately, we have an extremely coordinated scheme in which social ills produced in part 
by neoliberal reforms themselves become objects of neoliberal discipline to ensure the success of 
the former structural measures. It is important to note that this kind of arrangement is not unique 
to Mexico; Giuliani and his firm Giuliani Partners have had contracts elsewhere in Latin 
America, in Europe, and Africa (Mitchell and Beckett 2008, 99). It is thus one pervasive 
“channel” of a particular globalism of urban neoliberal development.  
 To conclude, these two distinct cases of bringing “development” and “globalization” to 
the spaces of downtown and Santa Fe in Mexico City show how different “channels” and 
different articulations of global capital take shape emergently and contextually. Not only are 
these sites themselves discrete and targeted (as Ferguson points out, capital does not “flow…it 
hops” [Ferguson 2006, 38]), they are also translated and made “global” through their own 
specificities and “cultural legacies.” Comparison of the Santa Fe megaproject and the “rescue” of 
historic downtown Mexico City reveals how actors claiming a global scale target particular sites, 
and how such sites structure and limit the globalist projects envisioned within them, the methods 
of their application, and the ways in which they are received. Between Santa Fe and downtown 
we see how elite globalist actors choose similar but distinct globalist aesthetics based on the pre-
inscribed meanings of space. The construction of Santa Fe into a “non-place” of global 
modernity was possible not only because of the fact that it was literally a garbage dump, but also 
because of the rendering of its history and its residents as equally undesirable; the space was a 
blank canvas, ripe for the erasure of place-based meaning in favor of hyper-modern aesthetics 
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and function. In contrast, downtown’s culturally sanctioned history and culture gave way to its 
construction as a commodified “heritage” site of national culture that coexists with modern 
capitalist globality, and its social ills rendered it in need of “rescue” rather than complete 
overhaul. In short, the demands of space and pre-inscribed meaning shape distinct visions and 
channels of neoliberal capitalist development. 
 Comparison of these globalist projects has analytic implications vis-à-vis the different 
scales and methods of neoliberalism. Both projects are emblematic of Mexico’s macro-scale 
neoliberal reforms begun in the 1980s, and the tactics of ensuring their viability as sites of global 
capitalism entailed the concomitant micro-tactics required for the success of such reforms, 
namely the disciplinary exclusion of those persons deemed “local” or not in line with the market 
order of things, a status articulated through rhetoric of safety, legality, and the social good. But 
despite these shared aims, the differential demands and uses of space establish different 
“channels” of creation. For Santa Fe, being an infrastructural blank slate allowed planners to 
exclude insidiously through restricting the means of access to those with cars and cash. For 
downtown, the heightened visibility and prior cultural status of the space gave way to a much 
more public method of exclusion and development: the hiring of former New York City mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani and the adoption of his infamous “zero tolerance” policing. Both megaprojects 
and the contracting of private consulting firms like Giuliani Partners are dominant globalisms in 
neoliberal capitalism and can be found elsewhere in the world, though of course they are always 
articulated through socio-historical specificities of place and culture. Although not discussed in 
detail here, both these projects in Mexico City are marked by great criticism and disenchantment 
in their own ways by elites as well as illegal street vendors (Jones and Morrenco 2017, 9; 
Mitchell and Beckett 2008, 98). In sum, despite many real and interesting similarities between 
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these two projects, their failures and disenchantments should caution social analysts from taking 
the apparent homogeneity of skyscrapers and Starbucks as “the beginning of an era” (Tsing 
2008, 73). The movements and demands of transnational capital are dominant and far-reaching, 
but they are always discretely spatialized, uniquely articulated, and made possible in particular 
sociocultural ways.  
Works Cited 
Becker, Anne, and Markus-Michael Müller. 2013. “The Securitization of Urban Space and the 
‘Rescue’ of Downtown Mexico City: Vision and Practice.” Latin American Perspectives 
40 (2): 77–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X12467762. 
Davis, Diane E. 2013. “Zero-Tolerance Policing, Stealth Real Estate Development, and the 
Transformation of Public Space: Evidence from Mexico City.” Latin American 
Perspectives 40 (2): 53–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X12467761. 
Escobar, Arturo. 2011. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World. Princeton University Press. 
Flannery, Nathan Parish. 2016. “Is Mexico City Turning Into New York City?” Forbes. May 31, 
2016. https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2016/05/31/is-mexico-city-
turning-into-new-york-city/#1db7840c2d9e. 
Hannerz, Ulf. 1990. “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture.” Theory, Culture & Society 7 
(2–3): 237–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/026327690007002014. 
Jones, Gareth A., and Maria Moreno‐Carranco. 2007. “Megaprojects.” City 11 (2): 144–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13604810701395969. 
Mirowski, Philip. 2009. “Defining Neoliberalism.” In The Road from Mont Pèlerin, edited by 
Dieter Plehwe and Philip Mirowski. Harvard University Press. 
Mitchell, Katharyne, and Katherine Beckett. 2008. “Securing the Global City: Crime, 
Consulting, Risk, and Ratings in the Production of Urban Space.” Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 15 (1): 75–99. https://doi.org/10.2979/gls.2008.15.1.75. 
Moreno-Carranco, María. 2014a. “Global Mexico Under Construction: The Santa Fe 
Megaproject in  Mexico City.” In Transbordering Latin Americas : Liminal Places, 
Cultures, and Powers (t)Here / Edited by Clara Irazábal., 187–214. Transnationalism. 
Routledge Research in Transnationalism ; 28. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis 
Group. 
———. 2014b. “Mexico City’s Challenged Megaproject.” Progressive Planning, no. 199: 4–7. 
Ong, Aihwa. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Duke 
University Press. 
Parnreiter, Cristof. 2016. “Mexico: The Making of a Global City.” In Global Networks, Linked 
Cities, edited by Saskia Sassen, 145–82. Routledge. 
Pun Ngai. 2005. Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace. Duke 
University Press. 
		 	
Hayman  
27	
Sassen, Saskia. 2016. “Introduction: Locating Cities on Global Circuits.” In Global Networks, 
Linked Cities, 1–38. Routledge. 
Tsing, Anna. 2007. “The Global Situation.” In The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader, 
edited by Jonathan Xavier Inda and Renato Rosaldo, 2nd edition, 66–98. Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Zaloom, Caitlin. 2010. Out of the Pits: Traders and Technology from Chicago to London. 
Paperback edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
  
  
